BRIEF NOTES IN CIVIL CASES
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS ADOPTION. Little appealed the adoption of MC, arguing that the COA erred in finding that his consent was not required and that adoption was not in the best interest of MC. The COA affirmed. The parties were divorced in 2017. Little was not granted visitation, and was not ordered to pay support, based on his incarceration.
There is no dispute that he has not seen the child nor paid any support since 2017. MC’s mother remarried in 2021. Little filed a petition for visitation, and the stepfather filed a petition to adopt. The trial court denied visitation and granted the adoption. Little argued that his lack of communication with MC was justifiable due to his incarceration, the divorce decree, and an order of protection.
Such impediments are not sufficient to justify lack of communication with a minor child. When an order of protection or a period of incarceration stems from an individual’s intentional misconduct, the individual cannot later use the order of protection or incarceration as justification for failure to communicate. The order of protection was based on Little’s abuse and threats to the mother, and his incarceration was based on 48 drug felonies. For a period of five years Little made no effort to contact MC, even when he was not incarcerated.
Little v. Roberts, 2026 Ark.App. 275.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Lori is the guardian of Jackson, an adult with multiple physical and intellectual disabilities. She applied for ARChoices in order to receive in-home care for Jackson. DHS denied the application. Lori requested a hearing. The ALJ affirmed the denial of benefits. Lori then sought judicial review.
The trial court remanded the case back to the agency on the basis that the record had not been fully developed.
DHS appealed. The COA dismissed for lack of a final order. A circuit court’s order of remand to an administrative agency for further proceedings is not a final, appealable order. ADHS v. Rawls, 2026 Ark. App. 284.
ARBITRATION.
This dispute arises from a contract between Kenworth and Gaston to repair a truck owned by Gaston. Gaston was presented with a final invoice in the amount of $65,245.88. Gaston refused to pay, contending that the repairs were done in a negligent manner. As a result, Kenworth retained possession of the truck and asserted a statutory lien. Gaston filed a complaint alleging breach of contract and tort of conversion, which included a demand for a jury trial. Kenworth responded with a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration.
Gaston denied signing the work order that contained the arbitration agreement.
Kenworth claimed it was signed via electronic signature pad. The trial court denied the motion, finding that it was a question of fact for a jury as to whether or not the signature was valid. Kenworth filed an interlocutory appeal. The COA affirmed. The right to a jury trial on the issue of the creation of an arbitration agreement is governed by the FAA, specifically 9 U.S.C. § 4. Regarding issues of formation of the contract, “ the party alleged to be in default [Gaston] may . . . demand a jury trial of such issue, and upon such demand the court shall make an order referring the issue or issues to a jury.” The trial court found, “We have as a fundamental tenet in the State of Arkansas a right to a jury trial.” Article 2, section 7 of the Arkansas Constitution.
The COA determined that the language of the FAA combined with the right to a jury trial supported the trial court’s decision.